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TRIAL BY JURY IN CIVIL CASES-A PROPOSED
REFORM
ROBERT T. DoNLEY*
In these hectic days we hear much of reform. On every
side lawyers especially are beset by zealous individuals or
organizations proclaiming that their particular innovation
in the legal or social scheme will remedy the most conspicu-
ous evil of society. In the turmoil surrounding these mul-
titudinous contentions discrimination is necessary, for we
cannot change the face of civilization in a day especially by
solemnly passing ill-considered laws. Nor, indeed, has it
ever been demonstrated, although not infrequently argued,
that if such a result were attainable, it would be desirable.
At best, we cannot do more than correct some of the most
obvious evils of the existing order.
It is perhaps a work of supererogation to argue that the
most outstanding reforms confronting lawyers are those in-
volving procedural matters in the trial of civil cases. So
far as the substantive law is concerned there is no wide-
spread complaint; it is the practical application of the sub-
stantive principles in order to render justice between
plaintiff and defendant that gives rise to injustices.
For example, consider the jury system particularly as
applied to the trial of civil cases. Lawyers have come by a
mystical heritage to regard that form of procedure with an
awe and reverence far out of proportion to its usefulness.
They jump with alacrity to its defense and such phrases as
"the safeguard of our ancient liberties" roll from unfamil-
iar tongues, and Magna Charta is murmured dimly.
But the din of the reformers, both lay and profession-
al, grows in volume, and though falling upon stubborn ears,
is penetrating the sound-proof halls of the lawyers. In-
telligent men, wearied of the delay, expense and seeming
imbecility of the accepted form of jury trial, are demanding of
lawyers that certain evils in the system be eliminated. The
problems are not new, but they are nevertheless problems,
and as such they have been the subject of comment by lead-
A lember of the Monongalia County Bar, West Virginia.
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ing members of the bar the nation over. In our own state,
Mr. Kemble White, as recently as October, 1927, in an ad-
dress before the West Virginia Bar Association,1 said:
"As yet this association has not formulatdd any policy
respecting two important agencies in the administration
of justice, namely, the common law jury and the office
of Justice of the Peace. * * * * It is beyond our thought
that the jury system should be abolished, but it is cer-
tainly to be desired that as an agency to enforce property
rights it should be so constituted that justice may be
administered promptly, effectively and without prohibi-
tive expense."
What are the charges against the present system of trial
by juryi? They are numerous, but the ones here under
discussion may be summarized generally as (1) the risk of
error in giving general instructions to the jury; (2) as a
result of (1), the frequent reversal of cases by the Supreme
Court, with the resultant delay and expense of one or two
new trials; (3) the inscrutability of the general verdict for
the reason that no one can say how the jury reached its con-
clusions; (4) as a result of (3) the determination of the
rights of parties on substantially a compromise basis with
little regard to the weight of evidence.
Of these evils, which must be admitted by an impartial
observer, two factors appear as the underlying causes,
namely, general instructionW and the general verdict. Some
patient analyst has shown, by an examination of cases de-
cided by appellate courts, that the most prolific cause of
reversal of cases is that of erroneous instruction to the
jury. Lawyers know that in the majority of instances the
"errors" are of so technical a nature as to be hardly under-
standable. A word omitted here, a phrase inserted there,
and the case goes back for the tedious trial all over again.
Perhaps the jury did not hear, much less understand, the
instructions, yet the Supreme Court takes the view that
"prejudice" has been inflicted upon the complaining party.
Or, if the jury actually were listening and if (however pre-
posterous) they understood, in all probability they decided
which party "ought to win" and if damages were involved,
each juror set out his own estimate and the sum total was
divided by twelve. Of course every lawyer knows that
IEEPORT OF W. VA. BAR ASSOCIATION, 43RD ANNUAL MEETING, 1927, p. 135, at 137.
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quotient verdicts are improper, if agreed upon beforehand,
but who besides the jurors can reveal the facts, and to this
end their lips are sealed. In discussing general instructions
to the jury, Professor Edson R. Sunderland, a recognized
authority upon the law of procedure, and whose casebook
on Common Law Pleading is now in use in the College of
Law of West Virginia University, ham said that :2
" * * * * while the jury can contribute nothing of value
so far as the law is concerned,it has infinite capacity for
mischief, for twelve men can easily misunderstand more
law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour.
Indeed, can anything be more fatuous than the expecta-
tion that the law which the judge so carefully, learnedly
and laboriously expounds to the laymen in the jury box
will become operative in their minds in its true form? *
* * * The instructions upon the law given by the court to
the jury are an effort to give, in the space of a few min-
utes, a legal education to twelve laymen upon the branch
of law involved in the case. Law cannot be taught in any
such way. As to 'this element, accordingly, the general
verdict is almost necessarily a failure."
Plainly, such pronouncements are not academic theoriz-
ing for every lawyer who has seen justice fail because of a
technical error in an instruction must recognize that Pro-
fessor Sunderland is dealing with deadly fact. He has like-
wise said of the general verdict that "the peculiarity of the
general verdict is the merger into a single indivisible
residuum of all matters, however numerous, whether of law
or fact."13
Of course if a system of trial whereby uncomprehended
rules of law and unknowable mental processes of twelve
men, compounded together into a verdict incapable of syn-
thesis, is the highest type of justice to which judicial pro-
cedure can attain, no more need be said. But intelligent
laymen and lawyers4 are crying out that such methods and
results are not justifiable and that better procedure can be
evolved. Lawyers, as a class, are prone to believe in the
fundamental perfection of whatever procedure they are
called upon to administer, but the average citizen may in-
quire in this wise:
2 Sunderland, "Verdicts, General and Special," 29 YALE L. J. 253, at 259.
1 Ibid, pp. 258-259.
' Robert H. Elder, "Trial by Jury: Is It Passing," HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April, 1928,
p. 670.
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If erroneous instructions to the jury are the most fre-
quent cause of error, injustice, and prolonged litigation,
why not abolish such instructions altogether?
If jurymen reach their verdicts haphazardly, or in such
a way that no one, even the parties concerned, can tell how
they were arrived at, why not abolish general verdicts al-
together?
Now, it is submitted that the average citizen has the
right to ask such questions, since he is the party most af-
fected by the existing defects in the system. And he has a
right to insist upon a reasonable answer; one that will sat-
isfy not juridical theory or legal casuistry, but common
sense. The members of the legal profession must admit
this position, unless they are prepared to defend the propo-
sition that judicial procedure does not exist for the purpose
of serving litigants, but that substance must wait upon
form, regardless of the result. Assuming that the reason-
ableness of the questions which our hypothetical man in the
street has asked is undisputed, we are confronted with the
problems of answering them. Can general instructions and
general verdicts legally be abolished? If so, what shall be
suhstituted in lieu thereof? Will the substitute cure the
existing defects? Even so, what are the possibilities of
creating new and greater evils than those proposed to be
eliminated? It is with some hesitation and with great
deference that the writer submits his view of the answers to
these troublesome matters.
(1) Can general instructiong and general verdicts be legally
abolished? The Constitution of West Virginia expressly pre-
serves the right of trial by jury in civil cases where the
amount in controversy is over $20.00, unless waived by
the parties. Certainly the entire system could be wiped out
by an amendatory stroke; but that such a result would be
desirable is, in the words of Mr. White, perhaps, "beyond
our thought." True, advanced thinkers are predicting the
ultimate, destruction of the common-law jury, and their ar-
guments are singularly convincing. 5 By the end of the cen-
tury such a change may be accomplished. But we are here
concerned with the immediate future, that is, the next iev-
5 Ibid, p. 570-580. Note particularly his criticism of the "special verdict," p. 578,
characterizing the form of questions as "a great stumbling-block."
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enty-five years. It is always hazardous to make predictions
upon these matters, especially in such nebulous fields as the
trend of thought and opinion. What must be considered
here is whether by act of the legislature general instructions
and general verdicts can be eliminated. As long as the
essential substance of the jury system is preserved: that the
jury shall hear the evidence as admitted by the Court; that
they shall determine the weight of evidence and credibility
of witnesses; that from the evidence they shall determine
the ultimate facts in the case; and assess damages to the
party entitled thereto under such facts and the law, no valid
reason is perceived nor can a reasonable one be imagined
why the change cannot be accomplished by legislative en-
actment.6 The next step in the problem is the creation of a
modified form of jury trial, preserving its essentials, and
yet taking away the most objectionable features. The bur-
den of this paper will therefore be the presentation of a
proposal to that end. The writer lays no claim to original-
ity in this; nor does he offer the agreeable stimulation of
newness and innovation never before attempted. The states
of Texas, Wisconsin, and North Carolina now have trials
by means of special interrogatories to the jury, at the op-
tion of the parties or on the court's own motion. Professor
Leon Green calls it a "new development in jury trial." He
has made a thorough analysis of the procedure in these
three states and his conclusions are set forth in the December,
1927, issue of the American Bar Association Journal. In
our own state, Mr. Thomas H. S. Curd made a similar pro.
pasal.7 The writer was impressed by the advantages of
such a system, and in collaboration with Mr. Curd and with
the very helpful advice of Honorable James W. McClendon,
Chief Justice of the Court of Civil Appeals, Third District,
Texas, has drafted the following statute. The method followed
was to make an analysis of the statutes of the three states
referred to, and select from each the most advantageous
provisions. Most of the decisions of these states construing
"The question of the constitutionality of any particular modification of the law
as to trial by jury resolves itself into a question of what requirements are fundamental
and what are unessential, a question which is necessarily, in the last analysis, one of
degree. The question, it is submitted, should be approached in a spirit of open-
mindedness, of readiness to accept any changes which do not impair the fundamentals
of trial by jury. It is a question of substance, not of form."
Scott, "Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure," 31 HARv. L. REV. 669(1918). Cf. Walker v. Southern Pac. R. R., 165 U. S. 593, 596 -(1897).
1 33 W. VA. LAW QuAR. 298.
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such statutes were likewise examined with a view to deter-
mining what portions of the statutes had been under con-
struction and definition, so that disputed matters and am-
biguities might be made clear in drafting a new form of
enactment. The statute so evolved is therefore a compos-
ite of the similar statutes of Texas, Wisconsin and North
Carolina, as illumined by judicial construction. It is offered
to the members of the bar of West Virginia as a definite
starting point in reaching the goal of a better, simpler, more
useful form of trial by jury in civil cases.
IV
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF JUDI-
CIAL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL BY JURY OF CIVIL ACTIONS AT
LAW AND ABOLISHING GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES AND
GENERAL VERDICTS OF JURIES, AND SUBSTITUTING IN LIEU
THEREOF TRIAL BY ANSWERS OF THE JURY TO SPECIAL INTER-
ROGATORES.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of West Virginia:
I
PURPOSE OF THIS ACT
Sec. 1-The purpose of this act is -hereby declared to be
as follows: To eliminate delay and confusion in the
trial by jury of civil actions at law; to decrease the
probability of error arising out of general instruc-
tions to juries; to enable juries more efficiently and
accurately to determine the material facts in issue
between the parties in any case; to insure that juries
shall be confined to the finding of facts only, and
the court to the application of the law to the facts
as thus found; and to decrease delay and expense
caused by reversal of cases by the appellate court
made necessary by erroneous general instructions to
juries.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2-The words used in this act shall be given their or-
dinary meaning and usage, subject to the exceptions
hereinafter defined.
See. 3-A special interrogatory is a question submitted to
a jury in writing, admitting of a direct answer, and
which calls upon the jury to determine some issue of
fact between the parties.
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Sec. 4-A main issue of fact8 is a material question of fact
affirmed by one party and denied by the other, aris-
ing upon the pleadings and which must be proved
by the party affirming it as a necessary part of his
cause of action or of his defense, unless by some pre-
sumption or principle of law the burden shifts.
I
FORM, PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION
Sec. 5-Upon the trial by jury of all civil actions at law,
the attorneys for the respective parties shall, before
argument to the jury, prepare and submit to the trial
court special interrogatories in writing.
Sec. 6-The said special interrogatories shall embrace the
main issue or issues of fact raised by the pleadings
and supported by any appreciable evidence in the
case.
(This "appreciable evidence" is inserted to avoid
confusion. Without it, the language could be con-
strued to require submission of an issue although
there was a failure of proof to sustain it.)
Sec. 7-Each issue shall be submitted distinctly and sep-
arately in a single special interrogatory, and shall
be answered by the jury separately in writing.
Sec. 8-So far as possible, such interrogatories shall not
be leading in form and shall admit of a direct an-
swer. But no case shall be reversed for the reason
that an intelligent juror might be able to infer from
the form of such interrogatory, the outcome of thejury's answer thereto upon the rights of the parties.
(The last sentence is deemed advisable, following
the holding of the court in Banderob v. Wisconsin, 113
N. W. 738.)
Sec. 9-All main issues of fact upon which the- law and
the evidence in any particular case raise a jury ques-
tion and which are necessary to a determination of
the rights of the parties, and arising upon the plead-
ings, and supported by the evidence, must be sub-
.mitted to the jury by such interrogatories. Such
8 See Texas City Transp. Co. v. Winters, 222 S. W. 540 (Tex. 1920) wherein the
Court. by Mc~lendon, J., says:
"By the expression 'issues of fact' is not meant the various controverted specific
facts which may enter into the main issues of fact, but only the independent ultimate
facts which go to make up plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's ground of defense.
If such ultimate issues of fact are fairly presented, the mode of presenting them by the
trial court will not be reviewed, even upon timely objection, in the absence of correct
special issues tendered by the objecting party, unless there is affirmative error In the
issue submitted by the Court."
See also Baxter v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644 (1899) where
Court, by Marshall, J., said:
'A failure to distinguish between such facts (material issues of fact raised by the
pleadings) and the numerous evidentiary circumstances which may be the subjects of
controversy on the evidence and are relied upon to establish the ultimate facts upon
which the case turns, often leads to unjust criticism of a special verdict."
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issues which under the law and the evidence are
questions for the court need not be submitted to thejury.
Sec. 10-Failure to submit an issue shall not be deemed a
ground of reversal of the judgment by the appellate
court unless its submission was requested by the par-
ty complaining of such omission by tendering to the
trial court an interrogatory in writing, covering the
same in proper form.(This provision is so worded that counsel cannot
verbally request an interrogatory at the last moment,
and then take advantage of their omission to have
the case reversed.)
Sec. 11-In event that counsel for the respective parties
cannot agree upon the material issues to be sub-
mitted, or upon the form of interrogatory embrac-
ing the same, the trial court shall thereupon settle
the issues by preparing interrogatories covering such
issues as counsel are unable to agree upon. Either
party may object to the action of the court in so do-
ing, and save an exception thereon; but the action
of the court ,shall not constitute reversible error un-
less the rights of the complaining party have been
clearly prejudiced.
(This provision is in accordance with what Mr.
Chief Justice Stacy, of the North Carolina Supreme
Court, states is the practice in that jurisdiction.
Some confusion might arise here, as any "objection"
might be construed as a "disagreement," with the
result that the trial court would have all of the labor
of preparing the interrogatories. Perhaps this sec-
tion would be better omitted.)
Sec. 12-In submitting special interrogatories, the trial court
may, upon request of either party, in writing, fr on
the court's own motion, submit in writing such ex-
planations and definitions of legal or technical terms
as shall be necessary to enable the jury to pass upon
and properly render correct answers to, the issues of
fact embraced in said interrogatories.0
Sec. 13-The trial court may also instruct the jury upon
the burden of proof, the measure of damages, the
law relating to the credibility of witnesses, and the
legal effect of writings introduced in evidence. But
this provision shall not authorize the trial court to
deliver a general charge or instructions to the jury,
Cf. Owens v. Navarro County Levee Imp. Dist., 115 Tex. 263, 280 S. W. 632(1926). "It is only when it is necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and
render a verdict on the issues submitted that the court is by statute required to submit
explanations in regard to special issues."
See also. Carter v. Haynes. 269 S. W. 216 (Tex. 1925); and Westchester FireIns. Co. v. Dickey, 246 S. W. 730 (Tex. 1923).
8
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nor to comment upon the weight of the evidence.
Sec. 14-Any special interrogatory prepared by counsel
for either or any of the parties, if leading in form,
or if involving the determination of more than one
main issue of fact, or if embraced in another inter-
rogatory previously submitted, or if otherwise ob-jectionable as likely to confuse or mislead the jury,
shall be refused or modified by the trial court; to
which either party may object and save an exception
thereon. But if not objectionable, the court shall
submit such interrogatories in the form prepared by
counsel.
Sec. 15-In all cases, the trial court shall indorse upon each
interrogatory "Refused," "Given," "Refused as
Modified," or "Given as Modified," according to the
action taken thereon. Any .modification so made
shall be distinctly noted on such interrogatory. In
all cases, in addition to the foregoing indorsement,
the judge of said court shall place his initials there-
under.
Sec. 16-Such given, refused, or modified interrogatories,
when objected to by counsel and so indorsed as above
provided, shall constitute a bill of exceptions and
the action of the trial court thereon shall be review-
able upon writ of error, certiorari, or other proper
mode of appellate review, or petitions therefor, by
the appellate court in the same manner and to the
same effect as if set forth in a special bill of excep-
tions. It shall be conclusively presumed that the
party requesting any said interrogatory which was
refused or modified, or refused or given as modified,
and excepting thereto, presented the same to the
trial court at the proper time, excepted to such re-
fusal or modification, and that all the requirements
of law have been observed.
Sec. 17--Special interrogatories shall be submitted to the
jury in substantially the following form :10
"A. B. vs. C. D.
Gentlemen of the Jury, you are instructed to
return in writing your answers to the following
questions, as you may believe or not believe them
to be established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence:
20 In Baxter v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., supra, n. 8, the Court also said: "The issues
of fact raised by the pleadings are to be passed upon by the jury. The legal conclusion
to be drawn from such findings is to be referred to the court with an additional con-
clusion by the jury, express or implied, that if the court should be of the opinion,
upon the whole case, as foud, that plaintiff has a good cause of action, they find for
the plaintiff, otherwise for the defendant." It was therefore thought advisable to in-
corporate this holding of the court expressly, instead of leaving the matter for inter.
pretation or implication.
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Question 1 * * * * (Answer Yes or No) * * * *
(and so on).
(Here the court may insert proper explanations
and definitions authorized by Sections 12 and 13.)
(At the conclusion thereof the following shall be
appended, to be signed by the foreman of the
jury):
"We, the jury, upon the facjs in this case as
found by us in answer to the above interrogatories,
if the law be for the plaintiff then we find for the
plaintiff and assess his damages in the sum of
$ ................ ; but if the law be for the defendant,
then we find for the defendant (and assess his
damages at $ ................, in any case involving a
set-off.)"
(This proposed form of verdict is inserted chief-
ly to avoid error, and also in an effort to make the
statute definite in detail. It is perhaps unnecessary
and possibly undesirable.)
Sec. 18-Upon the return of the answers of the jury to said
interrogatories the Court shall receive the same, if
proper, and render judgment thereon. But if such
answers are contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence, the Court shall disregard the same and
render judgment for the party entitled thereto as a
matter of law.
(The problem is presented in Henne and Mayer v.
Moultrie, 77 S. W. 607. There the court holds that
the trial court "has no power to enter judgment upon
facts well-pleaded and undisputably provcd, unless
the issue presented and proved has been found by
the verdict in favor of the party for whom judgment
is rendered." But, further holds that "the Court of
Civil Appeals, upon reversing judgments of the trial
courts, may enter final judgment when it appears
from the evidence in the record that one party, as a
matter of law, is entitled to such judgment, the evi-
dence being of such conclusive nature that the trial
court, in the performance of its duty, should have di-
rected a judgment in favor of that party." * " * "In a
proper case the judge may direct the verdict, but he
cannot disregard a verdict properly returned, and
give such judgment as the party is entitled to upon
the undisputed evidence."
Such a construction is due to the peculiar wording
of the Texas statute. Judge McClendon is strongly
in favor of giving the trial court the power to disre-
gard a verdict and to enter judgment for the party
10
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"entitled thereto as a matter of law."' 1 )
Sec. 19-Such special interrogatories, with the answers of
the jury thereto, and the explanations of the court
as hereinbefore authorized, when returned by thejury and signed by the foreman, and received by the
court, shall be and constitute a part of the record of
the case and shall be entered by the clerk in the law
order book, and shall be reviewable upon writ of
error, certiorari, or other proper mode of appellate
review, or petitions for the same, without the neces-
sity of a special bill of exceptions.
Sec. 20-The jury must agree unanimously upon its answers
to each and all of the special interrogatories sub-
mitted to. it. If such unanimous agreement cannot
be reached no judgment shall be rendered, nor any
answers received, but the trial court shall dismiss
the jury and order a new trial.
Sec. 21-The provisions of this act shall not prevent either
party from moving to strike out the evidence of the
other party and to direct a verdict; and if both par-
ties so move to strike out and direct, such motions
shall not be a waiver of trial by the jury as to either of
the parties. This act shall not prevent either party from
demurring to the evidence, or from making any
proper motion which heretofore might have been
made but for this act. (See 294 S. W. 331).
Sec. 22-The jury, in actions founded on contract or ac-
tions on bonds conditioned for the payment of
money, as provided by Chapter 131, Sections 14 and
16 of Barnes' Code of 1923, shall alssess damages to
the party entitled thereto, including principal and
interest to the date of the jury's finding on the in-
terrogatories.
Sec. 23-The jury shall assess damages to the party en-
titled thereto, as provided in Section 17, in all ac-
tions of assumpsit, debt, covenant; on motions forjudgment where the pleadings are made up and trial
by jury is not waived; and likewise the jury shall
auess all damages in all actions of trespass or tres-
pass on the case wherein pecuniary damages are
permitted; or upon writ of inquiry; or in any case
wherein the Court has directed a verdict for either
2 See also Kistler v. Latham, 255 S. W. 983 (Tex. 1923), in which there was an
issue as to whether there had been a parol modification of a written contract. The
Court thought the evidence inadmissible but nevertheless submitted to the jury an inter-
rogatory upon the question of whether tlare had been such modification. Trial court
entered judgment non obstante veredicto, the Court of Civil Appeals held such evidence
to be admissible and reversed the trial court; then the Supreme Court finally agreed
with the trial court and reversed the Court of Civil Appeals. Had it not been for the
submission of the issue to the jury, judgment could not have been entered, and the case
would have been sent back for a new trial. This is one illustration of the utility of
this form of procedure. (The writer is indebted to Xudge MdcClendon for calling his
attention to this case.)
11
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party; or on demurrer to the evidence.
Sec. 24-In any action not requiring the assessment of pe-
cuniary damages, the jury shall return the same
form of verdict provided in Section 17, omitting
however, the assessment of damages.
(This section is perhaps unnecessary, but is in-
tended to cover actions of detinue, unlawful entry
and detainer, and ejectment.)
JUDGMENT IN SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
Sec. 25-Upon writ of error, certiorari, or other proper
mode of appellate review, any incidental or subor-
dinate issues of fact not submitted and not request-
ed, in the lower court, shall be deemed a waiver of
trial by the jury, pro tanto, and any such issue shall be
conclusively presumed to be found by the trial court
in such manner as to support the judgment, provided
there is any appreciable amount of competent evi-
dence to sustain such presumed finding on said
omitted issues.
Sec. 26-The provisions of Section 25 shall not extend to
main issues of fact as defined in this act, and all such
main issues essential to the plaintiff's cause of action
or to defendant's defense, must be submitted to the
jury and answered by it, unless expressly waived.
(The last two sections are an effort to avoid the
confusion arising in the case of Citizens Nationai Bankc
of Brownwood v. Texas Compress Co., 294 S. W. 331.
There the Court, by McClendon. C. J., said, "In a
trial by jury on ,special issues there must be an af-
firmative finding on every issue necessary to support
the judgment. The power of the judge to make find-
ings where none are submitted or requested does not
extend to independent grounds of recovery or de-
fense, but only to incidental or subsidiary findings
necessary to ,support the judgment in connection with
the issues of fact submitted to and found by the
jury. A party may waive an issue upon which he
relies for recovery or defense by not requesting its
submission. In such case. the issue is treated. as
abandoned, and goes out of the case. There is no
affirmative finding thereon, and the judge is not giv-
en the power to make such affirmative finding, mere-
ly because the opposing party, upon whom no duty
in that regard rests, has not requested its sub-
mission."
12
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Therefore, the act is so framed that all main
issues must be submitted to and answered by the jury,
unless expressly waived. This is intended to compel
counsel to state with exactitude the grounds of re-
covery or defense relied upon. For example, in an
action on the case for injuries caused by the care-
less operation of an automobile, there may be two
or three counts. One is based upon excessive speed,
one on failure to give a warning signal, and one on
failing to drive upon the right side of the highway.
Suppose the evidence only supports one of these
grounds. Counsel should not be permitted to omit
the submission of the other two grounds of liability,
and then attempt to take advantage of that omission
by declaring that the statute makes the finding in
accordance with the judgment. It is thought better
to provide for an express waiver of any main issue,
upon which counsel do not intend to rely.)
Sec. 27-Upon writ of error, certiorari, or other mode of
review, the appellate court shall enter such judg-
ment upon the findings of the jury and the afore-
said presumed findings of the trial court upon
omitted issues, if any, as the trial court should have
entered, and render judgment for the party entitled
thereto as a matter of law; or shall grant a new
trial where the lower court should have granted the
same.
Sec. 28-No new trial shall be granted or judgment re-
versed, unless judgment according to the truth and
right of the case cannot be ascertained from a con-
sideration of the pleadings, the findings of the jury
and the findings conclusively presumed on omitted
issues, if any, and the evidence in the case.
ACTS REPEALED AND MODIFIED
Sec. 29-General instructions to juries and general verdicts
of juries in civil actions at law, except as herein
provided for, are hereby abolished.
Sec. 30-The following acts or parts of acts are hereby re-
pealed in so far as the same conflict with the pro-
visions of this act:
Barnes' Code of 1923; Section 5, of Chapter 131;
Chapter 131, Sections 22, 23, 24, and 25.
But this act shall not be construed to repeal the
following provisions of Barnes' Code of 1923:
Chapter 131, Sections 13 and 14.
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Chapter 116, Section 29
Chapter 106, Section 16.
Sec. 31-All acts or parts of acts in conflict with the pro-
visions of this act, whether herein expressly enumer-
ated or not, are hereby repealed.
Having now set forth a definite substitute, or at least the
embryo from which one may be developed, we come to the
third question raised, namely: Will the substitute cure the
existing defects? In discussing this the reader should con-
stantly bear in mind that we mean the general method of
special interrogatories, not necessarily the statute herein-
before set out. It seems perfectly obvious that if the exist-
ing defects are inherent in general instructions and general
verdicts, then to ask the question is to answer it. No longer
can there be reversal of cases for erroneous instructions,
for there are none in such a system of procedure as special
interrogatories. Likewise the principal criticism of the gen-
eral verdict, viz: its obscurity, is obviated, for in the verdict
by special interrogatories we have a detailed story of what
the jurors thought about every material issue in the case.
But we are in danger of claiming too much virtue for
the proposed change in procedure. The real objection to
the special interrogatory method is not that it fails to do
precisely what it was created to do. It does remedy the
old evils. The most critical objections to it are raised in
the fourth question: Does it create new and greater (or
equally great) evils than those eliminated?
Professor Sunderland 12 lists the objections to special in-
terrogatories, among others, as: (1) immaterial matters
may be included or material matters omitted; (2) conclu-
sions of law instead of conclusions of fact may be found;
(3) evidentiary instead of ultimate facts may be found;
and (4) questions may be put to the jury in such form as
to be uncertain, misleading, or prejudicial. Even in list-
ing these objections, he admits:
"The real objection to the special verdict is that it is
an honest portrayal of the truth, and the truth is too
' N. 2. supra.
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awkward a thing to fit the technical demands of the
record."
With all due deference to Professor Sunderland, it is sub-
mitted that the objections he has raised (and-if there were
others he would doubtless have raised them) are theoreti-
cal, academic, and speculative. Certain things may be done
or be omitted. Quite true, and the plaintiff may omit to
prove a breach of the promise, although he has proved
every other essential allegation of his declaration in assump-
sit. Yet no one contends that this is the fault of procedural
system. Rather one employs another lawyer. So far as
dealing with special interrogatories is concerned, there is
less likelihood of mistake, error or omission for the plain
reason that it is easier to ask questions concerning facts than
to propound accurate statements of law. For example:
P sues D for damages arising out of an automobile acci-
dent. Suppose there is no issue of contributory negligence.
We ask the jury:13
"Did D drive his automobile at the time and place of
the injury, in excess of the speed limit?"
"If so, was D's act in so doing the proximate and di-
rect cause of P's injurieg?"
Can there be anything uncertain, misleading, or prejudicial
in those questions? It may be contended that the jury
knows how its answers will affect the verdict and the judg-
ment of the Court, and therefore are prejudicial. If so, it is
a simple matter to insert the provision of Section 8.
As a practical matter, he is a poor lawyer who does not
know what facts are essential to his client's case, and what
facts are evidentiary and supporting only. It is essential,
for instance, that the jury determine whether D violated a
law enacted for the protection of individuals, viz: the
speed limit. It is'non-essential to know whether, five min-
utes prior to the collision, D stopped at the corner drug
st'ore and bought a cigar. An effort has been made in the
statute hereinbefore submitted, to define material issues,
and to provide that all of them must be submitted to the
jury, unless waived. As coordinate with this provision it is
also provided that issues which are not "main issues," which
!' See Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 240 S. W. 517 (1922), where the court
said: "In submitting either negligence or contributory negligence, special issues should
be restricted to specific acts of ifegligence alleged and proven."
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are not submitted and not requested, shall be deemed
found by the Court in such manner as to support the judg-
ment.
Now in discussing the whole matter of reform in jury
procedure, we have regarded along with the considerations
of* a technical nature which must make their appeal to
lawyers only, also those of a non-technical nature, in an
effort to look at the question from the side of the general
public whose rights and remedies are affected. Suppose
we have succeeded in explaining to Mr. A (not a lawyer)
the differences between general instructions and verdicts
and answers to interrogatories; and how certain evils may
be eliminated. Suppose that Mr. A then asks, "What is the
objection to interrogatories, if they accomplish these ends?"
We then say blandly, "The real objection to the special ver-
dict is that it is an honest portrayal of the truth." The
next serious question would then be whether Mr. A should
be indicted for felonious assault or whether a committee
should be appointed for him. In either case one's sympa-
thies are with the beleaguered, uncomprehending citizen.
What is really meant by such criticism is that, from a
professional point of view, it breaks in upon the procedural
system as a highly perfected, impeccable order in which
outward form is the chief consideration. That is, with the
general verdict we have something complete and enigmatic
wiihin itself, embodying a final and conclusive answer
which cannot be attacked, if properly rendered. Speci-
fically, it satisfies the requirements of form admirably if, at
the conclusion of a trial, the jury simply says, "We find for
the plaintiff." There is an end of the matter.
There are several answers to this objection. Primarily,
that it is largely psychological and deep-rooted by usage
and prejudice. That it is not substantial 14 is shown by the
very evident success of the special interrogatories or "spe-
cial verdict" in the three states which now employ the lat-
ter method. Again, we advert to the proposition that form
" In the Baxter Case, mcpra, n. 10, the court also said: "The object of a special
verdict is solely to obtain a decision of issues of fact raised by the pleadings, not to
decide disputes between witnesses as to minor facts, even if such minor facts are
essential to and establish, by inference or otherwise, the main fact. (Citing cases).
A strict compliance with this rule requires that the verdict be made up of sufficipnt
questions to at least cover, singly, every fact in issue under tho pleadings. If that
co2uld always be kept in view, the legitimate purpose of such a verdict in promoting
the administration of justice would be uniformly accomplished, and the opinion enter-
tained by some that its use is harmful would cease to exist."
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should be of secondary consideration where it seriously
hampers the administration of justice.
Further criticism will doubtless be forthcoming for less
laudable and more subtle reasons. There will be lawyers
to complain of the labor involved in preparing interrogatories.
Yet it remains to be shown that it is harder to ask questions
than to write law. There may be some who claim to be
members of a high profession, to protest that if judicial ad-
ministration is made too simple and workable, the business
of the lawyers will be diminished. For the hard facts are
that new trials are conducted not without compensation;
and personal injury verdicts may be lessened in amount
when the jury submits its computations to inspection.
But criticisms inspired either by indolence or avarice
need not detain us long. The point is that in analyzing
differences of opinion one should not be deceived by the
elaborate rationalizations of those prompted by self-
interest.
In conclusion it should perhaps be reiterated that the
writer has no delusions as to the perfection of the
system here proposed in detail. Doubtless changes will be
necessary, granting that at some future time it may be seen fit
to adopt such a modification of our procedure. Valid criti-
cisms heretofore unconsidered may interpose insurmount-
able obstacles. If so, the writer hopes that he will be the first
to acknowledge their validity and cogency. The most im-
portant single factor is the attitude of approach.15 Mr.
Glenn Frank, one of the clearest and shrewdest of contem-
porary observers, has said:
"I am concerned only to insist that politicians, educa-
tors, and parsons, while their actions at any given mo-
ment must, in a marked degree, conform to the custom
of the time, should do their thinking about the future as
if they had a clean slate upon which to write. Only so
will they free their minds from some ruinous if respect-
able traditions."
Finally, the writer desires to express his sincere apprecia-
tion of the generous aid and unselfish cooperation of Mr.
Thomas H. S. Curd; Honorable W. P. Stacy, Chief Justice of
3d An interesting view upon the psychological aspects of legal reform is set forth
by Hon. Joseph A.. Proskauer. "A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law
Reform," 14 A i. BAR ASS'N. JouRN. 121, larch, 1928.
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the State of North Carolina Supreme Court; Honorable A. J.
Vinje, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; and
especially to Honorable James W. McClendon, Chief Jus-
tice of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Third District,
-whose painstaking efforts and wise counsel have been an
unvarying source of inspiration.
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